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Theory of mindAlthough children typically comprehend the links between specific forms and their mean-
ings before they produce the forms themselves, the opposite pattern also occurs. The nat-
ure of these ‘reverse asymmetries’ between production and comprehension remains
debated. Here we focus on a striking case where production precedes comprehension in
the acquisition of Turkish evidential morphology and explore theoretical explanations of
this asymmetry. We show that 3- to 6-year-old Turkish learners produce evidential mor-
phemes accurately (Experiment 1) but have difficulty with evidential comprehension
(Experiment 2). Furthermore, comprehension failures persist across multiple tasks
(Experiments 3–4). We suggest that evidential comprehension is delayed by the develop-
ment of mental perspective-taking abilities needed to compute others’ knowledge sources.
In support for this hypothesis, we find that children have difficulty reasoning about others’
evidence in non-linguistic tasks but the difficulty disappears when the tasks involve
accessing one’s own evidential sources (Experiment 5).
 2015 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.Introduction
When learning their native language, children typically
understand the mappings between forms and their mean-
ings before they can produce these forms in speech. For
instance, babies produce their first words around their first
birthday but seem to have some understanding of spoken
language a few months earlier; moreover, this asymmetry
between comprehension and production is quite robust
across different structures (Bates, Bretherton, & Snyder,
1988; Goldin-Meadow, Seligman, & Gelman, 1976). This
makes sense since, logically, comprehension must precede
production: one must know the meaning carried by a par-
ticular form and represent the form-meaning mappings in
order to be able to use that form to convey an intended
meaning through speech (Clark, 1993).However, cases where the production of a form is more
advanced that its comprehension are not uncommon (see
Hendriks, 2013; Hendriks & Koster, 2010 for an overview).
For instance, English-speaking children produce the third-
person singular /s/ on novel verbs by age 2 or 3 (Theakston,
Lieven, & Tomasello, 2003), but can reliably use it as a cue
to subject number only after age 5 (Johnson, de Villiers, &
Seymour, 2005). Similarly, young English learners do not
have difficulty producing third person pronouns such as
him (Bloom, Barss, Nicol, & Conway, 1994) and do not con-
fuse pronouns and reflexives (e.g., himself) in production
(de Villiers, Cahillane, & Altreuter, 2006); however, when
presented with sentences such as ‘‘Ernie washed him” in
the presence of twomale referents, Ernie and Bert, children
younger than 6 typically interpret the pronoun him as the
reflexive himself (these difficulties are selective, since they
do not extend to sentences such as ‘‘Ernie washed
himself”; Chien & Wexler, 1990). To take another example,
children do not seem to infelicitously produce the
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and appropriate (Papafragou & Musolino, 2003), but fail
to reject infelicitous sentences with some such as ‘‘Some
elephants have trunks” in contexts where all would have
been acceptable (Noveck, 2001, cf. Guasti et al., 2005). In
a further demonstration, children between ages 4 and 5
consistently produced spatial modifiers (e.g., ‘‘the one on
the napkin”) when describing a particular agent’s action
in the presence of two potential referents (e.g., a frog sit-
ting on a napkin and another frog sitting on a plate). Nev-
ertheless, when presented with sentences such as ‘‘Put the
frog on the napkin into the box” in the presence of two
frogs, the same children consistently interpreted the
prepositional phrase ‘‘on the napkin” as the destination
of the action rather than the modifier of ‘‘the frog”, i.e., they
cannot use it as a cue to disambiguate between the refer-
ents in comprehension (Hurewitz, Brown-Bchmidt,
Thorpe, Gleitman, & Trueswell, 2000).
Two broad classes of explanations have been proposed
for these lags between production and comprehension
across different domains. One class of methodological
explanations attributes the delay in comprehension to fac-
tors extrinsic to the specific language domain under study.
Some researchers have proposed, for instance, that several
comprehension measures are metalinguistic in nature,
since they require children to reason explicitly about lin-
guistic expressions (Davies & Katsos, 2010; de Villiers &
Johnson, 2007; Johnson et al., 2005); others have hypothe-
sized that measures of comprehension often tax children’s
domain-general processing (Grodzinsky & Reinhart, 1993;
Reinhart, 2004) or pragmatic (Chien & Wexler, 1990) abil-
ities. On this view, the delay in comprehension should
diminish or disappear if task demands are modified to
reduce challenges and/or to accommodate children’s
immature processing abilities. In support of this possibil-
ity, tasks with minimized memory and metalinguistic
demands have revealed better comprehension perfor-
mance in some areas. For instance, experiments using a
head-turn procedure have demonstrated that 19-month-
olds are sensitive to the third-person singular /s/ agree-
ment morphology (Soderstrom, Wexler, & Jusczyk, 2002).
Similarly, comprehension tasks that do not require chil-
dren to explicitly evaluate the felicity of quantified state-
ments such as Some Xs Y have revealed that children are,
in fact, sensitive to the informativeness difference between
some and all (Chierchia, Crain, Guasti, Gualmini, & Meroni,
2001; Guasti et al., 2005; Katsos & Bishop, 2011).
A second class of explanations takes asymmetries
between production and comprehension to reveal a gen-
uine psycholinguistic phenomenon, as opposed to an
epiphenomenon that can be explained away by task
demands. These psycholinguistic explanations begin with
the assumption that the processes involved in production
and comprehension are not simply the same computations
executed in the reverse order (see, e.g., Hurewitz et al.,
2000). In comprehension, the listener must unpack the
meaning carried by the forms in incoming speech, and
integrate the linguistic information with the information
provided by the context and the speaker’s intentions. Com-
prehension is thus a form of a mental guessing game. But
in production, the speaker plans a message to convey anintended meaning through a particular form; and even
though the hearer’s needs may feed this process, the
speaker plans and executes an utterance with her own
goals, resources and perspective in mind. In adults, the
mechanics underlying the production and comprehension
processes have become exquisitely aligned – but in chil-
dren, the same form embedded into these processes may
be processed in radically different ways. Specific accounts
in this broad class have explained children’s failures to
use modifiers (e.g., ‘‘the frog on the napkin”) to disam-
biguate reference in comprehension as the result of the
slow integration of weak, discourse-based cues such as
modification into rapid parsing decisions (in combination
with other factors; see Hurewitz et al., 2000). In other
instantiations of psycholinguistic explanations, the produc
tion–comprehension gap in the third-person singular /s/
agreement and third-person pronouns such as him have
been attributed to children’s difficulty with the linguistic
perspective-taking necessary to monitor the contribution
of particular linguistic forms as opposed to other alterna-
tives in comprehension (Hendriks, 2013; Smolensky,
1996; cf. Brandt-Kobele & Höhle, 2010; Hendriks &
Koster, 2010; Hendriks & Spenader, 2005; Spenader, 2009).
In the studies reported here, we examine a striking case
of a production–comprehension asymmetry in children’
acquisition of evidentiality. This pattern has been previ-
ously noted in the developmental literature (Aksu-Koç,
1988; Ozturk & Papafragou, 2015; Papafragou, Li, Choi, &
Han, 2007), but its origins have not been systematically
explored. Our goal is to offer new, more robust empirical
evidence for the asymmetry focusing on the acquisition
of evidential morphology in Turkish; more importantly,
we seek to evaluate the relative contribution of method-
ological demands and the psycholinguistic properties of
evidentiality to children’s comprehension difficulties. We
aim to show that the facts about the acquisition of eviden-
tiality are best understood as the result of an interaction
between evidential meanings and the inherent
perspective-taking asymmetries between production and
comprehension. Before laying out the proposals that we
are going to evaluate, we describe the evidential system
in Turkish and review past studies describing its
acquisition.
The evidential system in Turkish: structure and acquisition
Languages indicate the source from which a piece of
information was acquired through evidentiality markers.
Some languages encode evidentiality through lexical
means: in English, for instance, several verbs (see, hear,
infer) and adverbials (reportedly, allegedly) encode eviden-
tial meanings. About one fourth of the world’s languages
encode evidentiality grammatically, mostly through mor-
phological means (Aikhenvald, 2004, 2014; Aikhenvald &
Dixon, 2001; Anderson, 1986; Chafe & Nichols, 1986; De
Haan, 2001; DeLancey, 2001; Faller, 2001; Givón, 1982;
Willet, 1988). For instance, in Turkish, two past-tense mor-
phemes, -dı and -mıs (realized as -dı, -di, -du, -dü, -ti, -tı,
-tu, -tü and -mıs, -mis, -mus, -müs respectively depending
on phonological factors) have evidential meanings,
i.e., they differentiate direct experience from indirect
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Johanson, 2003; Kornfilt, 1997; Slobin & Aksu, 1982). All
sentences in the past tense need to include one of these
markers as verb suffixes. Thus, sentence (1a) indicates that
the speaker has had first-hand experience of the event
(typically, through visual perception), and sentence (1b)
indicates that the speaker has indirectly acquired
information about the event – either through hearsay or
through inference.(1) a. Çocuk gel-di
boy come-PAST dir.3sg
The boy came (DIRECT)
b. Çocuk gel-mis.
boy come-PAST ind.3sg
The boy came (INDIRECT)Mothers of a nationally representative sample of
Turkish children report that 83% of the children produce
-dı and 48% of the children produce -mıs by age 2, whereas
these rates increase to 98% and 93% (respectively) by the
time children are 3-years-old (Aksu-Koç et al., 2011). Sim-
ilarly, naturalistic observations of children’s spontaneous
speech reveal that -dı and -mıs emerge between the ages
of 2 and 3 (Aksu-Koç, 1988). Nevertheless, these frequen-
cies need to be interpreted with caution and supplemented
with observations in more controlled contexts. In fact,
experimental studies have revealed that, across languages,
full semantic and pragmatic understanding of evidentiality
does not develop until the end of the kindergarten years,
and sometimes even later (see Matsui, 2014 for a review;
cf. Aksu-Koç, 1988; Aksu-Koç, Ögel-Balaban, & Alp, 2009;
Choi, 1995; de Villiers, Garfield, Gernet-Girard, Roeper, &
Speas, 2009; Fitneva, 2009; Ozturk & Papafragou, 2007,
2015; Papafragou et al., 2007; Ünal & Papafragou, 2013a).
Importantly for present purposes, children in many of
these studies consistently fail on comprehension tasks,
despite the fact that they can reliably produce the eviden-
tial morphemes in speech (e.g., Aksu-Koç, 1988; Ozturk &
Papafragou, 2015; Papafragou et al., 2007).
In a pioneering study, Aksu-Koç (1988) investigated the
acquisition of evidential morphology by Turkish-speaking
children. In an elicited production task, 3- to 6-year-old
children accessed events acted out with toys from a wit-
nessed/perceptual or a non-witnessed/inferential perspec-
tive and were asked to describe the events. Witnessed
events were expected to be described with -dı and non-
witnessed events were expected to be described with -
mıs. The same children were also given an comprehension
task, in which they had to match evidentially marked
utterances to characters in a story based on the characters’
informational access (witnessed/inferred) to events
(henceforth, the ‘‘who-said-it” task). In the production
task, 3- and 4-year-olds produced the appropriate eviden-
tials at levels at or higher than 70%. However, in compre-
hension the same level of performance emerged only at
age 6 and only on -dı trials; furthermore, even 6-year-
olds performed at chance level (56%) on -mıs trials.
Three- and 4-year-old children’s comprehension perfor-
mance was around 50% on -dı trials and 40% on -mıs trials.
In a follow-up task where children were asked to explainwhy they picked a particular character, only 25% of the
children were able to correctly justify their choices by
referring to the character’s informational access to the
event.
A similar asymmetry was obtained by Ozturk and
Papafragou (2015). Turkish-speaking children between
ages 5 and 7 had to describe short clipart animations that
either fully depicted an event or depicted some evidence
that would allow the children to infer what happened.
Children consistently marked the events they saw with -
dı (98% of the time), but were a lot less consistent in mark-
ing the events they inferred with -mıs (52% of the time).
Comprehension was measured with a version of the
‘‘who-said-it” task. Children were correct about 65% of
the time for -dı trials, and about 60% of the time for -mıs
trials. A direct comparison between the production and
the comprehension tasks confirmed that children per-
formed better in the production task compared to the com-
prehension task.
A further study by Papafragou et al. (2007) showed that
this asymmetry is not language-specific. In that study, 3-
and 4-year-old Korean children were quite successful in
producing both a direct (-e) and an indirect/reportative
morpheme (-tay); nevertheless, children had difficulty in
a ‘‘who-said-it” task measuring evidential comprehension.
Two further versions of the comprehension task were con-
ducted. In one of these tasks, one character uttered a state-
ment with either the direct or the indirect morpheme and
children had to accept/correct the statement depending on
the evidential basis of the speaker. In another task, one
character uttered a sentence with a direct and another
character a sentence with an indirect morpheme and chil-
dren were asked either who saw or who was told. These
versions also returned low comprehension accuracy.
Finally, there is evidence that the production–compre
hension asymmetry is not limited to languages that encode
evidentiality morphologically. In English, perception verbs
such as seem, sound, look, feel can be used to syntactically
encode evidentiality. The raised form of such verbs (e.g.,
‘‘John looks like he is sick”) expresses that the speaker
has direct evidence for the basic-level proposition asserted
in the utterance (i.e., John is sick), whereas the unraised
form of the verbs (e.g., ‘‘It looks like John is sick”) does
not make such a commitment and thus the speaker’s evi-
dence for the asserted proposition could either be direct
or indirect. Rett and Hyams (2014) conducted a corpus
study on the CHILDES database (MacWhinney & Snow,
1985, 1990) with children between the ages of 2 and 6
and confirmed that children begin modifying their utter-
ances (i.e., use the raised or the unraised form of the verbs)
depending on the type of evidence (direct or indirect)
between the ages of 2 and 3. In a later study, Winans,
Hyams, Rett, and Kalin (2014) measured comprehension
using a felicity judgment task. Children and adults were
presented with pictures that depict either direct or indirect
evidence and were asked to evaluate whether the raised or
the unraised forms were ‘‘a good or silly way of saying
what is going on in the picture.” Adults accepted unraised
forms regardless of type of evidence, but they overwhelm-
ingly rejected raised forms when presented in the context
of indirect evidence. By contrast, children between ages 4
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able in both direct and indirect evidence contexts and thus
showed no sensitivity to the relation between the syntactic
form and type of evidence.
Taken together, these studies point to a production–co
mprehension asymmetry in the domain of evidentiality
that appears to emerge cross-linguistically. However, two
issues remain open about the scope and nature of this
asymmetry. A first issue is that prior work has typically
used different stimuli to measure production and compre-
hension (Aksu-Koç, 1988; Ozturk & Papafragou, 2015;
Papafragou et al., 2007; Rett & Hyams, 2014; Winans
et al., 2014). It is therefore possible that at least some of
the observed effects relate to superficial differences
between experimental materials. A second, more substan-
tive issue is that prior studies raised various theoretical
possibilities to explain the observed production–compre
hension difference (Aksu-Koç, 1988; Papafragou et al.,
2007; Winans et al., 2014) but were not set up to adjudi-
cate between them.
In general, the spectrum of explanations for the eviden-
tiality facts can be organized into two classes that mirror
explanations for production–comprehension asymmetries
in other domains (see earlier discussion, and Ozturk &
Papafragou, 2015). One class of explanations is method-
ological: it proposes that the lag in the comprehension of
evidentiality is an artefact of the different methods used
to test production and comprehension. Recall, for instance,
that many prior studies used a version of the ‘‘who-said-it”
task where an evidentially marked utterance had to be
matched to one of two characters in accordance with their
access to information. In order to perform successfully in
that task, children had to identify the two characters’ infor-
mational access, retain an evidentially marked utterance in
their memory, unpack the meaning of the evidential mor-
pheme, think about how each of the two characters would
have described the event and pick the character whose
informational access matched the evidentially marked
utterance. Both memory and/or metalinguistic demands
might have made this comprehension task more challeng-
ing than a production task. A similar argument can be
made about felicity judgment tasks involving evidentials
(Papafragou et al., 2007; Winans et al., 2014). Thus,
cognitive-resource limitations might be responsible for
children’s comprehension failures.
A second class of explanations is psycholinguistic: it
proposes that the same evidential form needs to be pro-
cessed differently in production vs. comprehension
because of the way the meaning of evidentials interacts
with the self-other perspective difference between these
two processes. Specifically, in the production task, the
speaker encodes his/her own informational sources using
evidential morphology, whereas in the comprehension
task the hearer must consider someone else’s (the speak-
er’s) informational access in order to interpret an eviden-
tially marked utterance. To the extent that evidential
comprehension is an inherently metacognitive task that
requires reasoning about someone else’s information
sources and perspective, it is reasonable to expect it to
be more costly compared to evidential production. In sup-
port of this possibility, there is some evidence suggestingthat representing one’s own mental states, including the
sources of one’s knowledge, develops earlier than repre-
senting the mental states of others (Pillow, 2002; Pillow
& Anderson, 2006; Pillow, Hill, Boyce, & Stein, 2000;
Povinelli & de Blois, 1992; Sodian & Wimmer, 1987;
Wimmer, Hogrefe, & Perner, 1988). However, most of this
evidence comes from tasks that involved explicitly asking
children about mental state contents and may have under-
estimated children’s knowledge. Furthermore, these stud-
ies differed considerably in their methods and stimuli
from the studies on linguistic evidentiality and so their
results cannot be directly compared.Current study
In this paper, we present a series of five experiments
that assessed Turkish learners’ evidential production and
comprehension. Throughout, we focus on the direct evi-
dential (-dı) and the inferential interpretation of the indi-
rect evidential (-mıs). We begin by seeking more robust
evidence for whether production precedes comprehension
in the acquisition of evidentiality. In Experiment 1, we eli-
cited evidential production using a task modeled after
Aksu-Koç (1988). In Experiment 2, we developed a novel
task inspired by the earlier ‘‘who said it” task to measure
evidential comprehension using the same events. To fore-
shadow our findings, we replicated the asymmetry
between correct production and comprehension.
In the remaining experiments, we tested competing
predictions made by the two broad explanations of the evi-
dential asymmetry. On the methodological hypothesis, the
asymmetry should disappear if comprehension is assessed
in tasks that minimize memory and metalinguistic
demands; on the psycholinguistic hypothesis, the asym-
metry should persist. To test these predictions, in Experi-
ments 3 and 4 we used novel, simpler tasks to assess the
comprehension of evidentiality and compared the results
to both Experiment 1 and 2.
Furthermore, the methodological hypothesis expects
children’s difficulty to be tied to specific task demands,
and hence does not expect similar patterns of difficulty
to emerge in tasks in which children have to reason about
sources of information in the absence of evidential
morphology; however, the psycholinguistic hypothesis
predicts that children’s difficulty should extend to non-
linguistic contexts in which children have to reason about
others’ information sources (but should diminish or
disappear if children have to reason about evidence for
information from their own perspective). To test these
predictions, in Experiment 5 we removed evidential
language from the comprehension task of Experiment 4,
and asked children to reason about either someone else’s
or their own evidence for information.Experiment 1
The goal of Experiment 1 was to elicit production of evi-
dential morphemes for direct and indirect/inferential evi-
dence for events. Of interest was whether children would
modify their descriptions of the events based on the evi-
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quent tasks, we adopted a puppet theater set-up inspired
by some of Aksu-Koç’s (1988) tasks in which an event
either takes place in full view of the child or occurs behind
the curtains such that only its beginning and endpoint are
observable. We reasoned that this set-up would highlight
different types of access to an event (perceptual vs. infer-
ential) that might not otherwise be salient to children.
Method
Participants
Participants were native speakers of Turkish distributed
across four age groups: 3-year-olds (n = 12, 3;1–3;10,
Mage = 3;7), 4-year-olds (n = 12, 4;0–4;8, Mage = 4;4), 5- to
6-year-olds (n = 12, 5;6–6;5, Mage = 6;0), and adults (n = 7,
25–27, Mage = 26). Children were recruited through pre-
schools in Istanbul, Turkey. Adults were students at Koç
University, Turkey and participated in the experiment to
satisfy a course requirement.
Materials
There were two types of trials: Target trials and Filler
trials. The stimuli for Target trials consisted of mostly
change of state events in which a puppet performed
actions in a puppet theater. There were two types of access
depicted in these events: For Seen Events, the curtains of
the puppet theater were open throughout the event, so
that the participants witnessed the event (e.g., they saw
the puppet stack some blocks). For Inferred Events, the cur-
tains of the puppet theater were open for the beginning of
the event (such that children saw, e.g., the puppet holding
a balloon). Then, the curtains were drawn and the event
unfolded. Then, curtains were pulled back so that the end
state of the event (e.g., an inflated balloon) was observed.
Thus, even though the participants did not see the event,
they could infer what had happened based on available
evidence. For Inferred Events, the agent was present for
the beginning but not for the end state of the event. This
is because pilot testing revealed that when the puppet
was included at the end of the event alongside the object
that went through a change, children sometimes described
what object the puppet had (e.g., ‘‘He has a balloon”)
instead of describing what happened (i.e., the event). Thus,
the puppet was excluded from the end-state of the events
to elicit descriptions of the events. Examples of Seen and
Inferred events are presented in Fig. 1.
For Filler trials, the puppet showed an object that was
fully visible to the participants (e.g., a giraffe) but did not
perform any action on the object. The list of events used
in the production task (and the subsequent comprehension
tasks) is presented in Appendix A.
Four examples of each type of event were used for a
total of 8 Target trials in addition to 8 Filler trials. Partici-
pants were presented with all 16 trials in the same
semi-randomized order, with the constraint that there
was a Filler trial in-between two Target trials.
Procedure
Each participant was tested individually in a quiet room
at his/her preschool or university campus. Each child wasseated in front of the puppet theater. Experimenter 1
(E1) always interacted with the child. Experimenter 2
(E2) acted out the puppet, Mr. Nut, from behind the puppet
theater and was never seen by the child. E1 introduced Mr.
Nut to the child and asked the child to describe what Mr.
Nut did. In Filler trials, the child was asked to tell what
Mr. Nut’s toy was. We audio-recoded the child’s descrip-
tions. The procedure for the adults was exactly the same,
except that they watched pre-recorded videos of the pup-
pet performing the actions. We were interested in whether
Seen events would lead to the production of direct past
tense (-dı) and Inferred events would lead to the produc-
tion of indirect past tense (-mıs).
Results
Analytical strategy
Data from Experiment 1 (and all subsequent experi-
ments) were analyzed using multi-level mixed logit mod-
eling with crossed random intercepts for Subjects and
Items (Baayen, 2008; Baayen, Davidson, & Bates, 2008).
This analytical approach has two benefits. First, this
approach allows subjects and items to be treated as ran-
dom factors in a single model. Second, unlike traditional
analyses of variance (ANOVA) on proportions of categorical
outcomes obtained from subject and item means, this
approach allows for better treatment of categorical data
(Jaeger, 2008, cf. Barr, 2008; Fraundorf, Benjamin, &
Watson, 2013).
Model fitting and results
All models were fit using lmer function of the lme4
package (Bates, 2005; Bates, Maechler, & Bolker, 2011;
Bates, Maechler, Bolker, & Walker, 2015; Bates & Sarkar,
2007) in R Project for Statistical Computing (R
Development Core Team, 2012). The fixed effects that were
investigated in Experiment 1 were Condition (Seen,
Inferred), Age (Adults, 3-year-olds, 4-year-olds, 5- to 6-
year-olds) and an interaction between Condition and Age.
The fixed effect of Condition was coded with centered con-
trasts (0.5, 0.5). The fixed effect of Age was analyzed with
three planned comparisons using simple contrast coding
(c1: 0.25, 0.75, 0.25, 0.25; c2: 0.25, 0.25, 0.75,
0.25; c3: 0.25, 0.25, 0.25, 0.75) (Cohen, Cohen,
West, & Aiken, 2003). This coding strategy allowed us to
compare children in each of the three age groups to the
adult reference group while the intercept corresponded
to the grand mean. Fixed effects of Condition and Age in
Experiments 2 and 3 were also coded using the same con-
trasts. For completeness, our tables report parameter esti-
mates of all of the fixed effects that were tested (main
effects of Condition and Age, and Condition by Age interac-
tion), including the non-significant fixed effects.
Participants’ descriptions were transcribed and coded
by the first author. Beginning with Filler trials, both
children and adults were highly accurate in labeling the
objects (M3-year-olds = 0.93, M4-year-olds = 0.93, M5- to 6-year-olds =
0.96, Madults = 0.94).
For target trials, first we examined the proportion of
non-past tense uses for Seen and Inferred events across
the four Age groups (Table 1). Both children and adults
Fig. 1. Snapshots of the videos for Seen and Inferred Events in the Production task (Exp. 1). In the Seen event, the puppet first appears next to some blocks,
then stacks the blocks, and at the end stands next to the stacked blocks. In the Inferred event, the puppet holds a deflated balloon, then goes behind the
curtain; at the end, the curtain opens again and the balloon is inflated.
Table 1
Proportion of non-past tense uses for seen and inferred events (Experiment 1).
Adults 3-year-olds 4-year-olds 5- to 6-year-olds
M SE M SE M SE M SE
Seen 0.07 0.10 0.23 0.13 0.08 0.08 0.00 0.00
Inferred 0.00 0.00 0.05 0.06 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.04
Table 2
Fixed effect estimates for multi-level model of non-past tense uses in
Experiment 1.
Effect Estimate SE t-value
Intercept 0.05 0.02 2.58*
Condition (Inferred vs. Seen) 0.08 0.02 3.73***
Age (Adults vs. 3-year-olds) 0.10 0.07 1.52
Age (Adults vs. 4-year-olds) 0.01 0.07 0.09
Age (Adults vs. 5- to 6-year-olds) 0.02 0.07 0.39
Condition (Seen): Age (3-year-olds) 0.11 0.06 1.71
Condition (Seen): Age (4-year-olds) 0.01 0.06 0.19
Condition (Seen): Age (5- to 6-year-olds) 0.09 0.06 1.45
Formula in R: Non-Past  CONDITION ⁄ AGE + (1 | ID) + (1 | EVENT).
* p < .05.
*** p < .001.
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dency was especially prominent in the youngest group of
children.
Table 2 presents fixed effect parameter estimates for
the multi-level model of the non-past tense uses for the
target events. The model was fitted using restricted maxi-
mum likelihood estimation (REML) of parameters. The
dependent variable was binary values (present, absent)
for the use of non-past tense descriptions at the item level.Subjects (ID) and Items (EVENT) were added as crossed
random intercepts and Condition (Seen, Inferred) and Age
(Adults, 3-year-olds, 4-year-olds, 5- to 6-year-olds) were
added as fixed factors. The model revealed only a signifi-
cant main effect of Condition (p < .001): proportion of
non-past tense descriptions was higher for Seen events
(M = 0.10) as opposed to Inferred events (M = 0.02). No
other effects or interactions were significant.
For our main analysis, we excluded non-past tense
descriptions such that direct past tense (-dı) and indirect
past tense (-mıs) uses added up to 1. Table 3 presents the
proportion of descriptions marked with the direct past
tense (-dı) out of total past tense descriptions for Seen
and Inferred events across the four age groups. Scores clo-
ser to 1 indicate that participants were more likely to use
direct past tense (-dı); and scores closer to zero indicate
that participants were more likely to use indirect past
tense (-mıs). Both adults and children marked Seen events
with the direct past tense (-dı); also, both age groups
avoided marking Inferred events with the direct past tense
(-dı) and instead marked them with the indirect past tense
(-mıs).
Table 4 summarizes fixed effect estimates for the multi-
level model of the past-tense descriptions of target events.
The model was fitted using REML estimates of parameters.
The dependent variable was the binary values (present,
Table 3
Proportion of direct past tense (-dı) out of total past tense uses (Experiment 1).
Adults 3-year-olds 4-year-olds 5- to 6-year-olds
M SE M SE M SE M SE
Seen 1.00 0.00 0.91 0.09 0.86 0.10 1.00 0.00
Inferred 0.11 0.12 0.07 0.08 0.15 0.10 0.28 0.13
Table 4
Fixed effect estimates for multi-level model of direct past tense use in
target event descriptions in Experiment 1.
Effect Estimate SE t-value
Intercept 0.55 0.03 18.28***
Condition (Inferred vs. Seen) 0.79 0.04 19.41***
Age (Adults vs. 3-year-olds) 0.06 0.08 0.78
Age (Adults vs. 4-year-olds) 0.05 0.08 0.59
Age (Adults vs. 5- to 6-year-olds) 0.09 0.08 1.10
Condition (Seen): Age (3-year-olds) 0.06 0.10 0.57
Condition (Seen): Age (4-year-olds) 0.17 0.09 1.84
Condition (Seen): Age (5- to 6-year-olds) 0.17 0.09 1.84
Formula in R: DI_PAST  CONDITION ⁄ AGE + (1 | ID) + (1 | EVENT).
*** p < .001.
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item level. As mentioned above, Subjects (ID) and Items
(EVENT) were included as crossed random intercepts, and
Condition (Seen, Inferred) and Age (Adults, 3-year-olds,
4-year-olds, 5- to 6-year-olds) were included as fixed fac-
tors. The model revealed only a main effect of Condition
(p < .001) (Table 2). No other effects or interactions were
significant. Adults and children in all three age groups
were more likely to mark Seen events with the direct past
tense (-dı) as opposed to the Inferred events. These find-
ings confirm our prediction that Seen events would elicit
-dı and Inferred events would elicit -mıs.Discussion
Our findings suggest that young learners of Turkish
begin to successfully differentiate the two past tense mark-
ers on the basis of their evidential function at the age of 3.
Our task revealed better performance compared to prior
studies on Turkish, especially in terms of the indirect
past-tense morpheme (Aksu-Koç, 1988; Ozturk &
Papafragou, 2015; Ünal & Papafragou, 2013a). We specu-
late that our task provided naturalistic stimuli with rich
contextual information for inferred events (e.g., closing
the curtains while the event was unfolding), thereby facil-
itating the use of the indirect past tense (-mıs).1 We did not include the full set for brevity since children now had to
watch both versions of each event (see Procedure below). To ensure that
the events included in Experiment 2 elicited the intended evidentiality
markers, the proportion of descriptions marked with direct past tense (-dı)
out of total past tense descriptions in Experiment 1 was recalculated based
on this subset of events. Mean use of -dı was 94% for Seen events, and 19%
for Inferred events (compared to 94% and 16%, respectively based on the
full set of 8 events). This suggests that sampling from the original set of
events did not substantially affect the comparison to the production results
in Experiment 1.Experiment 2
The goal of Experiment 2 was to test young Turkish
learners’ evidential comprehension using the events that
reliably elicited evidential production from children of a
comparable age in Experiment 1. To do so, we modified
the ‘‘who said it” task of Aksu-Koç (1988). As in that task,we presented children with both ‘‘seen” and ‘‘inferred”
depictions of the same event. Unlike the earlier task, how-
ever, where two characters gained access to the event, a
single person (the experimenter) gained access to both
versions of the event and later produced an utterance
marked with either the direct (-dı) or the indirect (-mıs)
evidential. We were interested in seeing whether children
would match utterances marked with the direct past tense
(-dı) to the seen version and utterances marked with the
indirect past tense (-mıs) to the inferred version of the
events.Method
Participants
Data were collected from a new group of native speak-
ers of Turkish in four age groups: 3-year-olds (n = 11, 3;0–
3;10,Mage = 3;5), 4-year-olds (n = 11, 4;3–4;10,Mage = 4;6),
5- to 6-year-olds (n = 10, 5;7–6;7, Mage = 6;0), and adults
(n = 9, 18–23, Mage = 19;6). Children were recruited
through preschools in Istanbul, Turkey. Adults were stu-
dents at Koç University, Turkey and received course credit
for participation.Materials
As in Experiment 1, there were two types of stimuli. For
Target trials, stimuli consisted of videos of a subset of the
target events in Experiment 1.1 Each target event had two
versions: Seen and Inferred. As in Experiment 1, for Seen
Events, the curtains of the puppet theater were open for
the beginning, midpoint and end of the event so that the
event could be seen. For Inferred events, the curtains were
open only for the beginning and end of the event, so that
the event could be inferred on the basis of available evi-
dence. Both versions of each event were performed by the
same female experimenter, instead of a puppet. In each trial,
the two versions of each event (Seen and Inferred) were
arranged on a single screen (left–right position of versions
within a slide was counterbalanced).
For Filler trials, stimuli consisted of videos of the same
experimenter holding objects (e.g., a giraffe, a duck). In
each trial, videos containing two different objects were
paired together (e.g., the experimenter holding a giraffe
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duck). Again, these pairs were placed on a single display
and the position of the video on the slide was counterbal-
anced. There was a total of 6 Target trials and 6 Filler trials.
Items were arranged in a semi-randomized order, with the
constraint that there was a Filler trial in-between Target
trials. Half of the participants received the items in the
reverse order.
Procedure
Each participant was tested individually in a quiet room
at his/her preschool or university campus. Participants
were tested using a 13-in. MacBook Pro laptop. Partici-
pants were tested by an experimenter who was different
from the one that acted out the events in the videos. The
experimenter and the participant sat across from the
screen and next to each other. On Target trials, the exper-
imenter said: ‘‘Look! There are two videos here. We are
going to watch them one by one and then I’m going to
describe only one of them.” Then, the experimenter and
the participant watched videos of Seen and Inferred ver-
sions of the same event (e.g., the block-stacking episode)
that were presented one after the other on two sides of
the screen (see Fig. 2 for a schematic depiction). Next,
the experimenter uttered a description with either the
direct past tense -dı as in (2) or the indirect past tense -
mıs as in (3). Then, the experimenter asked: ‘‘Which one
did I describe?”(2) Küp-ler-i diz-di.
Block-pl-ACC stack.PAST dir.3sg(3) Küp-ler-i diz-mis.
Block-pl-ACC stack.PAST ind.3sgOn Filler trials, participants watched videos of the same
person holding two different objects (e.g., a duck and a gir-
affe) that were shown side by side on the screen. Again, the
videos were presented sequentially. The experimenter
labeled one of the objects and participants were again
asked to find the corresponding video. The video that the
experimenter described (i.e., the correct response) was
counterbalanced across participants.
If participants differentiated the two past tense mor-
phemes on the basis of their evidentiality, the likelihood
of picking the Seen event should change depending on the
evidential marking in the sentence uttered by the experi-
menter. Specifically, participants should pick the Seen event
upon hearing an utterance marked with the direct past
tense (-dı) and avoid picking the Seen event and instead pick
the Inferred event upon hearing an utterance marked with
the indirect past tense (-mıs). However, if participants failed
to differentiate -dı and -mıs in comprehension, then the
likelihood of picking the Seen event should stay the same
regardless of whether the experimenter utters a sentence
with the direct or the indirect past tense.
Results
We followed the same model fitting and effect coding
procedures as in Experiment1 (see Model fitting andresults above in Experiment 1 for more information).
Beginning with the performance in Filler trials, we
assessed performance with a multi-level mixed logit model
using REML estimates of the parameters. The dependent
variable was binary values (0,1) for selecting the video that
contained the labeled object at the trial level. Subjects (ID)
and Items (Object) were included as crossed random inter-
cepts and Age (Adults, 3-year-olds, 4-year-olds, 5- to 6-
year-olds) was included as a fixed factor. The model
revealed only a significant Intercept (b = 0.95, SE = 0.02,
p < .001). The lack of an Age effect suggests that children’s
performance was at adult level even at age 3 (M3-year-olds =
0.88, M4-year-olds = 0.97, M5- to 6-year-olds = 0.98, Madults = 1.00).
Thus, the children in our experiment do not seem
to be having difficulty with linking object labels to
videos.
Next, we assessed performance on Target trials. Table 5
presents proportion of picking the Seen event across Age
groups when participants were presented with utterances
marked with the direct past tense (-dı) or the indirect past
tense (-mıs).
Data were analyzed using multi-level mixed logit mod-
eling with REML estimates of the parameters. The depen-
dent variable was binary values (0,1) for picking the Seen
event. Subjects (ID) and Items (EVENT) were included as
crossed random intercepts, and Condition (Heard Direct
Past Tense, -dı; Heard Indirect Past Tense, -mıs) and Age
(Adults, 3-year-olds, 4-year-olds, 5- to 6-year-olds) were
included as fixed factors. Table 6 summarizes the fixed
effect estimates for the multi-level model of picking the
Seen event in Target trials. The model revealed a main
effect of Condition (p < .001), and an interaction between
Age and Condition (p < .001). Follow up analyses on the
Age by Condition interaction with separate mixed models
on picking the Seen event for each Age group with Subjects
and Items as random intercepts and Condition as the fixed
factor revealed that the likelihood of picking the Seen
event differed as a function of the evidential marking in
the utterance (-dı or -mıs), but only for Adults (p < .001).
Children were equally likely to pick the Seen event upon
hearing an utterance marked with either the direct or the
indirect past tense (all p > .05).
Furthermore, the proportion of picking the Seen event
was compared to chance level (0.50) with one-sample t-
tests. As expected, adults selected the Seen event at levels
significantly above chance when they heard an utterance
marked with the direct past tense (-dı) (t(8) = 12.64,
p < .001) and at levels significantly below chance when
they heard an utterance marked with the indirect past
tense (-mıs) (t(8) = 6.10, p < .001). However, children in
all three age groups performed at chance level regardless
of evidential marking (-dı or -mıs) (all p > .05).
Discussion
Taken together, Experiments 1 and 2 demonstrated a
production–comprehension asymmetry in the domain of
evidentiality. In production (Experiment 1), children reli-
ably used the direct past tense (-dı) morpheme to describe
events that they visually perceived and the indirect past
tense (-mıs) morpheme to describe events that they
Fig. 2. Summary of experimental design for Exps. 2–5.
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sion, however (Experiment 2), children’s likelihood of pick-
ing the Seen event did not differ depending on whether
they had previously heard utterances marked with the
direct past tense (-dı) or the indirect past tense (-mıs)morpheme. Furthermore, children’s difficulties seemed to
be selective, since children in all three age groups were
highly successful in the Filler trials of the comprehension
task that involved object labels. Our findings replicate the
asymmetry documented in the literature in both Turkish
Table 5
Proportion of picking the Seen event across Age groups (Experiment 2).
Adult 3-year-olds 4-year-olds 5- to 6-year-olds
M SE M SE M SE M SE
Direct past tense (-dı) 0.96 0.06 0.57 0.16 0.61 0.15 0.67 0.17
Indirect past tense (-mıs) 0.15 0.12 0.57 0.16 0.58 0.15 0.46 0.18
Table 6
Fixed effect estimates for multi-level model of picking the Seen event in Target trials in Experiment 2.
Effect Estimate SE t-value
Intercept 0.56 0.07 8.44***
Condition (-dı vs. - mıs) 0.27 0.06 4.88***
Age (Adults vs. 3-year-olds) 0.01 0.10 0.11
Age (Adults vs. 4-year-olds) 0.04 0.10 0.35
Age (Adults vs. 5- to 6-year-olds) 0.01 0.11 0.06
Condition (-dı vs. - mıs): Age (Adults vs. 3-year-olds) 0.81 0.16 5.15***
Condition (-dı vs. - mıs): Age (Adults vs. 4-year-olds) 0.79 0.15 5.12***
Condition (-dı vs. - mıs): Age (Adults vs. 5- to 6-year-olds) 0.60 0.17 3.59***
Formula in R: Seen  CONDITION ⁄ AGE + (1 | ID) + (1 | EVENT).
*** p < .001.
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Papafragou, 2015; Papafragou et al., 2007; Rett & Hyams,
2014; Winans et al., 2014) and extend prior findings by
showing that the asymmetry persists even when the same
events are used to compare production and
comprehension.
At present, our results leave all theoretical options
open. A first possibility is that the observed production–c
omprehension asymmetry is due to the specific task
demands of our comprehension task. Even though our goal
was to simplify the ‘‘who said it” task (Aksu-Koç, 1988;
Ozturk & Papafragou, 2015; Papafragou et al., 2007) by
having a single person (the experimenter) gain access to
the same event from two perspectives (direct/visual vs.
inferential), this step may not have helped young children.
Furthermore, as in the earlier task, children heard a single
evidentially marked sentence and presumably had to gen-
erate an unspoken alternative (i.e., the other evidential) so
as to decide which version of the event was the best match.
Both the generation of such alternatives (Barner, Brooks, &
Bale, 2011; Chierchia et al., 2001) and the subsequent
memory and computational demands of aligning mor-
phemes to events may be problematic for young children.
Alternatively, our production–comprehension findings
may be due to psycholinguistic factors that have to do with
the perspective differences inherent in talking about one’s
own access to information vs. unpacking others’ access to
information from their speech. (Notice that both of these
possibilities can account for the fact that children’s failures
did not extend to the object label trials.)
Even though the current data cannot adjudicate
between them, these two accounts diverge in their predic-
tions about the robustness and extent of children’s com-
prehension difficulties. The methodological account
predicts that the difficulties should diminish in less
demanding measures of evidential comprehension andmight entirely disappear in tasks that do not involve
understanding evidential morphology. The psycholinguis-
tic account, however, predicts that the difficulty should
persist in several versions of comprehension tasks, as long
as they still involve reasoning about the available evidence
from another’s perspective; furthermore, the difficulty
should extend to cases where children are asked to reason
about others’ knowledge sources in the absence of eviden-
tial morphology. In Experiments 3–5, we tested these pre-
dictions more fully.Experiment 3
Experiment 3 introduced a new task that asked children
to consider the speaker’s informational access in under-
standing evidentials but was simpler than Experiment 2.
In the new task, two puppets gained access to an event
in the same way (i.e., they both either saw or figured out
what happened). The puppets then went on to offer identi-
cal descriptions of the event, except that one was marked
with the direct past tense (-dı) and the other with the indi-
rect past tense (-mıs). Children were asked ‘‘who said it
better”. This task had lower demands compared to Experi-
ment 2 in two respects: first, children were presented with
only one type of access (perceptual or inferential) to an
event instead of seeing two perspectives on the same
event; second, children were provided with the two con-
trastive (direct vs. indirect) descriptions of the event, such
that they did not have to generate the other alternative.
There is evidence that contrastive contexts are a good tool
for revealing children’s sensitivity to linguistic distinctions.
In one particularly relevant demonstration (Ozturk &
Papafragou, 2014), 4- to 5-year-old English learners were
asked to evaluate epistemic modal statements in a hide-
and-seek scenario. The majority of the children failed to
Table 7
Proportion of selecting the utterance marked with direct past tense across
Age groups (Experiment 3).
Adult 3-year-olds 4-year-olds 5-year-olds
M SE M SE M SE M SE
Seen 0.95 0.13 0.56 0.14 0.72 0.14 0.62 0.14
Inferred 0.14 0.08 0.41 0.14 0.56 0.13 0.59 0.13
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box” when the statement was weaker than the available
evidence (e.g., when the cow had to be in the pink box).
However, when given a choice between may and has to
versions of the same statement in the same context, chil-
dren overwhelmingly chose the modal that was most
appropriate based on the evidence available to the speaker
(see also Chierchia et al., 2001; Hirst & Weil, 1982). In line
with this evidence, the methodological account – but not
the psycholinguistic account – predicts that Turkish learn-
ers’ evidential comprehension should improve in the con-
trastive task of Experiment 3 compared to Experiment 2.
Method
Participants
Data were collected from a new group of native speak-
ers of Turkish across four age groups: 3-year-olds (n = 13,
3;4–3;11, Mage = 3;8), 4-year-olds (n = 13, 4;1–4;10,
Mage = 4;7), 5- to 6-year-olds (n = 13, 5;5–6;1, Mage = 5;10),
and adults (n = 7, 18–32, Mage = 22;6). Children were
recruited through preschools in Istanbul, Turkey. Adults
were students at Koç University, Turkey and participated
in the experiment to satisfy a course requirement.
Materials
Stimuli were the same as in Experiment 2. Unlike the
earlier study, only one version of a Target or Filler event
was present on the screen at a time. Two lists were created
and each version of a Target event (Seen, Inferred) was
assigned to one of the lists. Fillers were the same across
lists. Each list thus contained 3 Seen and 3 Inferred Target
trials, as well as 6 Filler trials. Each list was arranged in a
semi-randomized order, with the constraint that there
was a Filler trial in-between two Target trials. Each partic-
ipant saw one of the two lists.
Procedure
Each participant was tested in a quiet room at his/her
preschool or university campus. Testing involved a 13-in.
MacBook Pro laptop.
On Target trials, participants were presented with
either a Seen or an Inferred event on the screen (see
Fig. 3 for a sample trial). Two puppets (a penguin and a
squirrel) acted out by the same experimenter watched
the event with the participants. The pair of puppets
remained the same throughout the experiment. Each pup-
pet offered a description of the event: one used the direct
past tense (-dı) morpheme as in (2) above and the other
one used the indirect past tense (-mıs) morpheme as in
(3) above. Participants were asked to choose the puppet
that ‘‘said it better”. In half of the trials, the penguin
uttered the correct sentence; in the other half of the trials
the squirrel uttered the correct sentence. The assignment
of sentences to puppets (and thus the puppet that uttered
the correct description) was counterbalanced across
participants.
On Filler trials, participants were presented with videos
of someone holding an object (e.g., a giraffe). Each puppet
labeled the object differently (e.g., ‘‘This is a giraffe”, ‘‘Thisis a duck”). Again, participants picked the puppet that ‘‘said
it better”.
If participants discriminated between the two past
tense markers on the basis of evidentiality, then the likeli-
hood of selecting the utterance marked with the direct past
tense (-dı) as a better description of the event should
change depending on type of access to the event. That is,
participants should select the utterance marked with the
direct past tense (-dı) when presented with a Seen event,
and avoid picking the utterance marked with the direct
past tense (-dı) (and instead pick the utterance marked
with the indirect past tense -mıs) when presented with
an Inferred event.
Results
First, we assessed performance in Filler trials with
multi-level mixed logit modeling using REML estimates
of the parameters. We used the procedures of Experiments
1 and 2 to fit the models and code for fixed effects. The
dependent variable was binary values (0,1) for picking
the puppet that correctly labeled the object in the video
at the item level. Subjects (ID) and Items (Object) were
added as crossed random intercepts and Age (Adults, 3-
year-olds, 4-year-olds, 5- to 6-year-olds) as a fixed factor.
As expected, the model revealed a significant Intercept
(b = 0.95, SE = 0.02, p < .001) and no significant effect of
Age. Even the youngest group of 3-year-olds were highly
accurate on Filler trials (M3-year-olds = 0.87, M4-year-olds =
0.96, M5- to 6-year-olds = 0.97, Madults = 1.00).
Next, we examined performance in Target trials. Table 7
presents the proportion of picking the utterance marked
with the direct past tense (-dı) across Age groups when
participants are presented with either Seen or Inferred
events.
Table 8 presents the fixed effect estimates for the multi-
level model of selecting the utterance marked with the
direct past tense (-dı) in Target trials. The dependent vari-
able was binary values (0,1) for selecting the utterance
marked with the direct past tense (-dı). Subjects (ID) and
Items (EVENT) were included as crossed random intercepts
and Condition (Seen, Inferred) and Age (Adults, 3-year-
olds, 4-year-olds, 5- to 6-year-olds) were included as fixed
factors. The analysis revealed a main effect of Condition
(p < .001) and an interaction between Condition and Age
(p < .001). Follow up analyses on the Age by Condition
interaction with separate mixed models on selecting the
utterance marked with the direct past tense for each Age
group with Subjects and Items as random intercepts and
Condition as the fixed factor revealed that the likelihood
of selecting the utterance marked with the direct past
tense (-dı) as a better description of the event differed as
Table 8
Fixed effect estimates for multi-level model of selecting the utterance marked with the direct past tense in Target trials in Experiment 3.
Effect Estimate SE t-value
Intercept 0.55 0.03 17.69***
Condition (Inferred vs. Seen) 0.25 0.06 4.23
Age (Adults vs. 3-year-olds) 0.12 0.09 1.39
Age (Adults vs. 4-year-olds) 0.08 0.09 0.85
Age (Adults vs. 5- to 6-year-olds) 0.05 0.09 0.61
Condition (Inferred vs. Seen): Age (Adults vs. 3-year-olds) 0.78 0.18 4.36***
Condition (Inferred vs. Seen): Age (Adults vs. 4-year-olds) 0.67 0.18 3.68***
Condition (Inferred vs. Seen): Age (Adults vs. 5- to 6-year-olds) 0.78 0.18 4.36***
Formula in R: Direct  CONDITION ⁄ AGE + (1 | ID) + (1 | EVENT).
*** p < .001.
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only for Adults (p < .001). Children from all three age
groups were equally likely to pick the utterance marked
with the direct past tense (-dı) as a better description of
either Seen or Inferred events (all p > .05) and therefore
did not differentiate between the evidential function of
the two past tense morphemes.
Furthermore, adults selected the utterance marked with
the direct past tense (-dı) at levels significantly different
from chance when presented with a Seen (t(6) = 9.61,
p < .001) or an Inferred (t(6) = 3.59, p = .01) event. How-
ever, children’s selection of the utterance marked with
the direct past tense (-dı) did not differ from chance perfor-
mance for both Seen and Inferred events (all p > .05).
Discussion
In Experiment 3, we considered the possibility that
Turkish learners’ evidential comprehension might improve
in a contrastive task with lower demands, as predicted by
the methodological account. An alternative possibility was
that children’s difficulty in evidential comprehension
would persist in such a task, as long as children still had
to reason about the meaning of evidential morphemes
with respect to someone else’s evidence for information.
Our results supported the second possibility: children
lacked a consistent preference for mapping the direct (-
dı) or indirect past tense (-mıs) to the relevant type of
access to an event (perception vs. inference from observ-
ables). Finally, as in Experiment 2, children were highly
successful in Filler trials and thus did not have a general
difficulty in making comparative judgments. Together,
our findings provide initial evidence against the method-
ological explanation of the production–comprehension
asymmetry in the domain of evidentiality.Experiment 4
The goal of Experiment 4 was to further test the theo-
retical accounts of the delay in evidential comprehension.
According to the methodological account, reducing task
demands further could reveal success in evidential com-
prehension that might have been masked by the compre-
hension tasks of Experiments 2 and 3. In this study, we
presented children with an accessible (seen or inferred)
event and a ‘‘mystery” event. One puppet had access tothe accessible event and the other had access to the ‘‘mys-
tery” event. Children then heard an utterance that
described the accessible event but contained either a cor-
rect or an incorrect evidential; their task was to attribute
the utterance to one of the puppets. To succeed, children
needed to pick the accessible event when there was an evi-
dential match but choose the inaccessible (‘‘mystery”)
event in case of an evidential mismatch. Since there was
no information about the inaccessible event, this task
essentially relied on a single comparison between the evi-
dential utterance and the accessible event. In this respect,
it was simpler than prior paradigms that involved compar-
ing a single evidential utterance to two events (Experiment
2) or two evidential utterances to a single event (Experi-
ment 3). Thus the methodological hypothesis predicts that
performance in evidential comprehension should improve
compared to prior studies. By contrast, the psycholinguis-
tic explanation predicts that performance should remain
the same, since this task still requires reasoning about
the speaker’s knowledge source.Method
Participants
Data were collected from a new group of native speak-
ers of Turkish across two age groups: 4-year-olds (n = 11,
3;10–4;11, Mage = 4;6) and 5- to 6-year-olds (n = 9, 5;3–
5;11,Mage = 5;7). We only looked at older children because
they were more likely to benefit from task modifications.
Children were recruited through preschools in Istanbul,
Turkey.Materials
We refilmed the Seen and Inferred versions of the 6 Tar-
get events in Experiments 2 and 3 with the same female
experimenter who acted out the events in the earlier
experiments; the only difference was that we added a pup-
pet who was outside the puppet theater and gained access
to the events. We supplemented them with Seen and
Inferred versions of 6 additional events (with puppet
observers) that were similar to the first set (see Appendix
B for event lists). For the total set of 12 events (each with
two versions: Seen and Inferred), we used 4 different pup-
pets (a penguin, a cat, a bunny, and a squirrel) as the obser-
ver of the event. These events were accessible from both
the puppet’s and the child participant’s perspective, and
Fig. 3. Examples of matching and mismatching trials where the accessible event was Seen (right panel) or Inferred (left panel).
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pet served as the observer of the accessible event 3 times.
We also filmed a set of 4 ‘‘mystery” events. In each of
these, one of the four puppets peeked behind the curtains
of the puppet theater. The puppets were the same ones
that served as the observers for the accessible events.
These mystery events led to some unspecified knowledge
on the part of the puppet (but were inaccessible to child
participants). To create test trials, we paired one accessible
event (in either the Seen or the Inferred version) with one
‘‘mystery” event on a single screen (see Fig. 3). We used the
following constraints. First, accessible events were always
placed on the left and inaccessible events on the right side
of the screen (and unfolded in that sequence). Second,
within a trial, the puppet in the accessible event was
always different from the puppet in the inaccessible event.
Third, a given puppet pair within a trial (e.g., cat and
bunny) was repeated only once but the assignment to
the accessible vs. inaccessible event was switched the sec-
ond time. Finally, we created two practice trials. These
were similar to the test trials but the accessible events con-
sisted of videos of the same agent holding an object (cf. the
Filler trials of Experiment 3).
Two lists were created such that each version of an
accessible Target event (Seen, Inferred) was assigned toone of the lists. Each list thus contained 12 test trials, with
6 of the accessible events were Seen and 6 of the accessible
events were Inferred. ‘‘Mystery” (inaccessible) events, as
well as the on-screen pairings of Target and mystery
events were the same across lists. Each list was arranged
in the same random order. The two practice trials were
placed at the beginning of each list. Each participant saw
one of the two lists.
Procedure
Each child was tested individually in a quiet room at
his/her preschool with a 13-in. MacBook Pro laptop. As
described above, on a given test trial the accessible event
was presented on the left side of the screen and the inac-
cessible event was presented on the right side of the
screen. The accessible event was either Seen or Inferred.
The experimenter gave the following instructions: ‘‘Look,
there are two screens here. A girl will be playing some
games on these screens and these puppets will be watch-
ing. We can only see what the girl is doing in one of these
screens. The curtains will be closed in the other one, but
this puppet can look behind the curtains and watch the
girl.” Then, the experimenter played the videos one by
one and presented children an evidentially marked utter-
ance and asked: ‘‘Who said it?”.
Table 10
Fixed effect estimates for multi-level model of selecting the accessible
event in Experiment 4.
Effect Estimate SE t-value
Intercept 0.65 0.06 10.82***
Evidential Type 0.01 0.05 0.13
Evidence Type 0.03 0.05 0.57
Age 0.13 0.12 1.09
Evidential Type ⁄ Evidence Type 0.16 0.10 1.54
Evidential Type ⁄ Age 0.01 0.10 0.13
Evidence Type ⁄ Age 0.13 0.10 1.28
Evidential Type ⁄ Evidence Type ⁄ Age 0.27 0.21 1.28
Formula in R: Accessible  EVIDENTIAL TYPE ⁄ EVIDENCE TYPE ⁄ AGE
+ (1 | ID) + (1 | EVENT).
*** p < .001.
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the action in the accessible event but the evidential aligned
with the puppet’s (and the child’s) access to this event only
half of the time. Fig. 3 presents examples of Matching and
Mismatching Evidential trials for when the accessible
event is Seen or Inferred. For example, when the accessible
event involved the puppet seeing a girl stack blocks, the
direct past-tense (cf. top-left panel) was a semantic match.
But when the accessible event involved the puppet seeing
that a girl ate a cookie, the indirect past-tense (as in
bottom-left panel) was a mismatch. Conversely, if the
accessible event involved the puppet inferring that a girl
ate a cookie the direct past tense would be a mismatch
(cf. top-right panel); but when the accessible event
involved the puppet inferring that a girl stacked some
blocks then the indirect past tense would be a match (as
in bottom-right panel).
The order of trials was semi-randomized with the con-
straint that a given type of trial (Matching or Mismatching)
did not repeat more than twice. There were 6 Matching
and 6 Mismatching trials in total (with 3 Seen and 3
Inferred events within each type). The assignment of
events to evidential matches vs. mismatches was fixed
(see Appendix B).
As mentioned earlier, there were two practice trials in
the beginning of the experiment. The accessible events
consisted of videos of the same agent holding an object.
The instructions were exactly same as the main experi-
ment but children heard an utterance identifying an object
(e.g., ‘‘There is a giraffe”) and were asked ‘‘who said it”. In
the first practice trial, the label matched the identity of the
object in the accessible event but in the second it did not.
After children responded in each practice trial, the curtains
of the theater in the mystery event were opened so the
children could receive feedback about the accuracy of their
response. The experimenter then told children: ‘‘Look, even
if we cannot see what is behind the curtains, the puppet is
seeing something”. This was done to confirm that inacces-
sible events were viable choices.
If children differentiated the evidential meaning of the
two past tense morphemes, the likelihood of picking the
accessible event should differ as a function of the eviden-
tial marking in the utterance. In other words, the children
should (a) pick the accessible event when they heard an
evidential that matched the type of evidence that the pup-
pet had in that event (Matching Evidential trials) and (b)
avoid picking the accessible event when they heard an evi-
dential that did not match the type of access that the pup-Table 9
Proportion of selecting the accessible event across types of evidence and
evidential marking in Experiment 4.
4-year-olds 5-year-olds
M SE M SE
Seen
Matching evidential 0.56 0.14 0.81 0.16
Mismatching evidential 0.64 0.14 0.78 0.14
Inferred
Matching evidential 0.64 0.15 0.63 0.13
Mismatching evidential 0.53 0.15 0.67 0.16pet had in the event and instead pick the inaccessible event
(Mismatching Evidential trials). However, if children did
not differentiate the two past tense markers on the basis
of evidentiality, then the likelihood of picking the accessi-
ble event should not change across Matching Evidential
and Mismatching Evidential trials. Since the base sentence
(minus the evidential) always described the action in the
accessible events correctly, if children failed to integrate
evidential meaning into sentence interpretation, they
might pick the accessible event regardless of whether the
utterance had a Matching or a Mismatching Evidential.Results
Table 9 presents the proportion of selecting the accessi-
ble event across types of evidence presented in the acces-
sible event (Seen, Inferred) and type of evidential
marking in the utterance (Matching, Mismatching) pre-
sented to the children across age groups.
As in previous experiments, data were analyzed with
multi-level mixed logit modeling with REML estimates of
the parameters. The same model fitting procedures of
Experiments 1–3 were used. The dependent variable was
binary values (0,1) for selecting the accessible event. Sub-
jects (ID) and Items (EVENT) were included as crossed ran-
dom intercepts. Evidence Type (Seen, Inferred) in the
accessible event, Evidential Type (Matching, Mismatching)
and Age (4-year-olds, 5-year-olds) were included as fixed
factors. Because all three variables (Evidence Type, Eviden-
tial Type and Age) had two levels each, fixed effects for
each variable were coded using centered contrasts (0.5,
0.5).
Table 10 presents a summary of fixed effect estimates
for the multi-level model of selecting the accessible event.
The model revealed only a significant intercept (p < .001).
No other effects or interactions were significant. Both age
groups were more likely to pick the accessible event com-
pared to the inaccessible event. Furthermore, children’s
likelihood of picking the accessible event did not change
depending on whether the evidential marking in the utter-
ance matched the type of evidence in the accessible event.
Because the basic level proposition in the utterance (minus
the evidential) correctly described the action in the acces-
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neglected the evidential and responded based on whether
the rest of the sentence matched the accessible event.
Importantly, the likelihood of picking the accessible event
was the same regardless of whether the accessible event
was Seen or Inferred, suggesting that children did not have
a bias to pick either a Seen or an Inferred accessible event.
This conclusion is also supported by the fact that the
selection of the accessible event was above chance level
the evidential marking in the utterance matched the type
of evidence in the accessible event (t(21) = 2.63, p = .02);
and approached above chance levels the evidential mark-
ing in the utterance did not match the type of evidence
in the accessible event (t(20) = 2.01, p = .06), while it
should have been below chance level.Discussion
Experiment 4 introduced an evidential comprehension
task that did not require comparing two different eviden-
tially marked utterances or two different sources of infor-
mation for the same event. Participants only had to
compare a single evidential statement to the way a puppet
gained access to an event; children themselves had the
same access to the event as the puppet. If there was a mis-
match between the statement and the puppet’s experience,
children could attribute the statement to another puppet
who gained access to an inaccessible (‘‘mystery”) event.
Despite this difference from earlier tasks, the findings of
Experiment 4 cohere with those of Experiments 2 and 3:
Turkish-speaking children showed no sensitivity to evi-
dential meaning. Even when the evidential misrepresented
the evidence present in the accessible event, children did
not reliably switch to the inaccessible event. Together,
the results from Experiments 2, 3 and 4 show that the
delay in comprehension of evidential morphology in Turk-
ish persists across alternative tasks with varying demands.
This conclusion is unexpected on the hypothesis that
evidential comprehension difficulties are tied to method-
ological factors but is entirely consistent with the psy-
cholinguistic account of how evidentials are understood.2Experiment 5
In Experiment 5, we turned to the conceptual underpin-
nings of linguistic evidentiality. We used the paradigm of
Experiment 4 but replaced the evidentially marked utter-
ances with non-past tense (infinitival) verb forms that
either matched or did not match the accessible event. We
used these verbs to ask whether Turkish learners can eval-
uate whether the evidence available to someone was suffi-
cient for them to be knowledgeable about an event. We
were especially interested in whether children’s ability to
reason about evidence for information differs when they
reason about others’ knowledge (Others task) and their2 A potential concern about Experiment 4 is that children resisted
picking the ‘‘mystery” event because there was uncertainty or confusion
about that option. Because the design and results of Experiment 5 address
this concern, we postpone its discussion until the next section.own knowledge (Self task; see Ünal & Papafragou, 2013a,
2013b).
The outcome of this study bears directly on explana-
tions of the delay in the comprehension of linguistic evi-
dentials in Turkish learners. According to the
methodological account, children might perform better in
a knowledge-attribution task that does not involve eviden-
tial language. Importantly, this account does not predict
any difference in performance depending on whether or
not the task involves a Self-oriented or Others-oriented
perspective. By contrast, according to the psycholinguistic
account, children’s performance should remain poor in a
knowledge-attribution task that does not involve eviden-
tial language as long as that task requires reasoning about
others’ information sources. However, performance should
improve when the perspective-taking component is




In the Others task, participants were 10 4-year-old
(Mage = 4;6, 3;10–4;11) and 13 5- to 6-year-old (Mage = 5;8,
5;0–6;4) native speakers of Turkish. In the Self task,
participants were 12 4-year-old (Mage = 4;6, 4;0–4;11)
and 13 5- to 6-year-old (Mage = 5;7, 5;1–6;5) native
speakers of Turkish. Participants were recruited through
preschools in Istanbul, Turkey.
Materials
The visual stimuli were the same as in Experiment 4. A
set of changes was made to the verbal stimuli (see Fig. 3 for
a summary). The evidentially marked utterances were
replaced with verbs in the infinitive form (‘‘to V”, broadly
equivalent here to the -ing form in English). We chose this
form because it is the ‘‘unmarked” form of the verb that
allows reference to events without encoding tense, aspect,
or evidentiality. The resulting sentences were grammatical
in Turkish. The Matching and Mismatching trials were kept
the same, but instead of manipulating the match between
evidential marking and type of access for the accessible
event, we manipulated the match between the verb con-
tent and the accessible event. For Matching trials, the verbs
used were the ones in the evidentially marked utterances
of Experiment 4 (e.g., when the accessible event involved
either seeing a stacking action or inferring that stacking
had occurred, children were asked about ‘‘to stack”/‘‘dizm
ek”). For the Mismatching trials, we devised verbs that
would clearly be incorrect if applied to the accessible event
(e.g., when the accessible event involved either seeing a
biting action or inferring that biting had occurred, children
were asked about ‘‘to wash”/‘‘yıkamak”). The list of events
and Matching vs. Mismatching Verbs is presented in
Appendix B.
Procedure
The procedure was the same as Experiment 4 with the
following exceptions. In the Others task, children’s task
was to find which of the two puppets knew about an event.
Thus, at the end of each trial, the experimenter pointed to
Table 11
Proportion of selecting the accessible event across evidence and verb types in the Others and Self Tasks in Experiment 5.
Others task Self task
4-year-olds 5-year-olds 4-year-olds 5-year-olds
M SE M SE M SE M SE
Seen
Matching Verb 0.63 0.15 0.69 0.13 0.72 0.13 0.74 0.12
Mismatching Verb 0.40 0.16 0.51 0.14 0.23 0.12 0.36 0.13
Inferred
Matching Verb 0.63 0.15 0.67 0.13 0.82 0.11 0.82 0.11
Mismatching Verb 0.47 0.16 0.38 0.14 0.46 0.14 0.26 0.12
Table 12
Fixed effect estimates for multi-level model of selecting the accessible
event in the Others Task in Experiment 5.
Effect Estimate SE t-value
Intercept 0.55 0.05 11.34***
Verb Type 0.21 0.07 3.09*
Evidence Type 0.02 0.06 0.4
Age 0.03 0.09 0.4
Verb Type ⁄ Evidence Type 0.02 0.11 0.14
Verb Type ⁄ Age 0.03 0.11 0.28
Evidence Type ⁄ Age 0.11 0.11 0.95
Verb Type ⁄ Evidence Type ⁄ Age 0.18 0.22 0.81
Formula in R: Accessible  VERB TYPE ⁄ EVIDENCE TYPE ⁄ AGE + (1 | ID)
+ (1 | EVENT).
* p < .05.
*** p < .001.
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about <infinitive>, which puppet should you ask?” The
rationale was that children should (a) pick the puppet
observing the accessible event when they were asked
about a verb that matched that event (Matching Verb tri-
als), and (b) avoid picking the puppet observing the acces-
sible event and instead pick the puppet observing the
inaccessible alternative when the verb did not match the
accessible event (Mismatching Verb trials). In the Self task,
the procedure was exactly the same but at the end of the
trial, the experimenter pointed to the two videos and
asked: ‘‘Which one has <infinitive>?” The rationale for
responding was similar to the Others task but involved
answering from one’s own perspective instead of adopting
the puppets’ perspective.Table 13
Fixed effect estimates for multi-level model of selecting the accessible
event in the Self Task in Experiment 5.
Effect Estimate SE t-value
Intercept 0.55 0.05 11.81***
Verb Type 0.45 0.08 5.42***
Evidence Type 0.08 0.05 1.71
Age 0.01 0.06 0.2
Verb Type ⁄ Evidence Type 0.04 0.09 0.37
Verb Type ⁄ Age 0.05 0.09 0.54
Evidence Type ⁄ Age 0.18 0.09 1.9
Verb Type ⁄ Evidence Type ⁄ Age 0.31 0.18 1.63
Formula in R: Accessible  VERB TYPE ⁄ EVIDENCE TYPE ⁄ AGE + (1 | ID)
+ (1 | EVENT).
*** p < .001.Results
Table 11 presents the proportion of selecting the acces-
sible event across types of evidence in the accessible event
and types of verb in the Others and Self Tasks. Data from
both tasks were analyzed using mixed logit modeling with
REML estimates of the parameters. The models were fitted
using the same procedures as in previous experiments. The
dependent variable was binary values (0,1) for selecting
the accessible event. Subjects (ID) and Items (EVENT) were
included as crossed random intercepts. Evidence Type
(Seen, Inferred) in the accessible event, Verb Type (Match-
ing, Mismatching) and Age (4-year-olds, 5-year-olds) were
included as fixed factors. As in Experiment 4, all fixed fac-
tors were coded using centered contrasts (0.5, 0.5).
Table 12 provides a summary of the fixed effect esti-
mates for multi-level model of selecting the accessible
event in the Others Task. The model revealed only a main
effect of Verb Type (p < .05). The likelihood of selecting
the accessible event was higher for Matching Verbs
(M = 0.66) than for Mismatching Verbs (M = 0.44). No other
effects or interactions were significant. Furthermore, the
proportion of selecting the accessible event was signifi-
cantly above chance level for Matching Verbs (t(22)
= 2.72, p = .01) but did not differ from chance level for Mis-
matching Verbs (t(22) = 1.04, ns).
Performance in the Others task was compared to perfor-
mance in the evidential comprehension task of Experiment
4 using multi-level mixed logit modeling. The dependent
variable was binary values (0,1) for selecting the accessible
event; Subjects (ID) and Items (EVENT) were included ascrossed random intercepts and Experiment (4, 5/Others)
and Trial Type (Matching, Mismatching) were included as
fixed factors. Including Age and/or Evidence Type as fixed
factors did not reliably improve fit based on a chi-square
test of the change in 2 restricted log likelihood compared
to the model that included Experiment and Trial Type the
fixed factors (all p > .05). Unsurprisingly, the model
returned an Experiment by Trial Type interaction
(b = 0.21, SE = 0.08, p = .006): the likelihood of selecting
the accessible event did not differ between Matching
(M = 0.65) and Mismatching (M = 0.64) Trials in the com-
prehension task of Experiment 4, but the likelihood of
selecting the accessible event was significantly lower for
Mismatching trials (M = 0.44) compared to Matching trials
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there was no effect of Experiment (p = .9) suggesting that
the overall performance did not improve after evidential
language was removed.
Table 13 presents the fixed effect estimates for multi-
level model of selecting the accessible event for the Self
Task. As expected, the model revealed a main effect of Verb
Type (p < .001). Both age groups were more likely to select
the accessible event when asked about a Matching Verb
(M = 0.77), compared to when they were asked about a
Mismatching Verb (M = 0.31) for both Seen and Inferred
events. As in the Others Task, there were no significant
effects or interactions of Evidence Type (Seen, Inferred)
and/or Age (4-year-olds, 5-year-olds). Also as expected,
proportion of selecting the accessible event was signifi-
cantly above chance level for Matching Verbs (t(24)
= 6.35, p < .001) and below chance level for Mismatching
Verbs (t(24) = 3.81, p = .001).
Performance in the Others and Self tasks were com-
pared with a multi-level mixed logit model that had
selecting the accessible event at the trial level as the
dependent variable, Subjects (ID) and Items (EVENT) as
crossed random intercepts and Task (Others, Self) and
Verb Type (Matching, Mismatching) as fixed factors. Mod-
els that included Age and/or Evidence Type as fixed fac-
tors did not reliably improve fit based on a chi-square
test of the change in 2 restricted log likelihood com-
pared to the model that included Experiment and Trial
Type the fixed factors (all p > .05) so they were omitted
from the model. The model revealed a main effect of Verb
Type (b = 0.34, SE = 0.06, p < .001) and an interaction
between Task and Verb Type (b = 0.25, SE = 0.07,
p < .001). In both tasks, the likelihood of selecting the
accessible event was higher for Matching Verbs compared
to Mismatching Verbs. However the difference in the like-
lihood of selecting the accessible event between Matching
and Mismatching Verbs in the Self task (0.77 vs. 0.31,
respectively) was larger than the same difference in the
Others task (0.66 vs. 0.44, respectively). That suggests
that children were much more successful in differentiat-
ing between the Matching and Mismatching Verbs in
the Self task than in the Others task, leading to better
overall accuracy in the Self task (M = 0.73) compared to
the Others task (M = 0.61). In fact, a similar mixed logit
model that had accuracy at the trial level as the depen-
dent variable only revealed a main effect of Task
(b = 0.12, SE = 0.05, p = .008), confirming that children’s
performance improved in the Self task.
Discussion
Experiment 5 used the design of Experiment 4 but
replaced the comprehension task involving evidential
morphology with a task that assessed whether children
understand how evidence and knowledge are linked in
others (Others task) or oneself (Self task). In the Others
task, children had difficulty linking evidence and event
representations in others’ minds; their performance was
similar to Experiment 4. In the Self task, however, where
children were asked to link evidence to event representa-
tions in their own mind, performance improved. Experi-ment 5 alleviates a concern with the design of
Experiment 4, since it shows that children’s failures in
the earlier study were not simply due to a dispreference
for inaccessible (‘‘mystery”) events. Most importantly,
together with Experiment 4, the findings of Experiment
5 support the position that the comprehension lag in
the domain of linguistic evidentiality is not explained
by methodological factors but seems to be due to the psy-
cholinguistic process of linking evidentials to others’
knowledge sources.General discussion
Young learners typically comprehend the meaning of
linguistic forms before they produce these forms in speech.
However, cases where production precedes accurate com-
prehension have also been reported in various domains.
This unusual pattern has been previously attributed to
either the processing/metalinguistic demands of compre-
hension tasks (Chien & Wexler, 1990; Davies & Katsos,
2010; de Villiers & Johnson, 2007; Grodzinsky & Reinhart,
1993; Johnson et al., 2005; Reinhart, 2004) or to psycholin-
guistic properties of comprehension itself (Hurewitz et al.,
2000; cf. Hendriks, 2013; Smolensky, 1996 for a different
approach). In the studies reported here, we examined evi-
dentiality, a domain that is known to give rise to a produc
tion–comprehension asymmetry across languages (Aksu-
Koç, 1988; Ozturk & Papafragou, 2015; Papafragou et al.,
2007; Rett & Hyams, 2014; Winans et al., 2014). Focusing
on evidential morphology in Turkish, we sought to system-
atically explore the theoretical explanations of this asym-
metry. Below we summarize our main findings and
sketch their implications for the acquisition of evidential-
ity, as well as the relation between production and com-
prehension more generally.Production and comprehension of evidential morphology in
Turkish
Turkish encodes evidential meanings in its past-tense
morphemes -dı (direct) and -mıs (indirect evidence; Aksu
& Slobin, 1986; Johanson, 2003; Kornfilt, 1997; Slobin &
Aksu, 1982). Prior work reported that the acquisition
of these morphemes was protracted, with some aspects
of evidential meaning being inaccessible even at the age of
6 or 7 (Ozturk & Papafragou, 2007, 2015; Papafragou
et al., 2007; Ünal & Papafragou, 2013a); furthermore, Turk-
ish learners were reported to be more accurate in produc-
ing these morphemes than in understanding them in the
speech of others (e.g., Aksu-Koç, 1988; Ozturk &
Papafragou, 2015). In a first set of experiments, we revis-
ited the age of acquisition of the Turkish evidential mor-
phemes. We compared the direct morpheme
(instantiated in scenes involving visual perception of an
event) and the inferential interpretation of the indirect
morpheme (instantiated in scenes involving backward
causal inference about an event based on visual cues). To
highlight the difference between seeing vs. inferring an
event, we used naturalistic stimuli that included salient
cues about how an event was accessed (i.e., a puppet the-
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vs. closed halfway). Unlike prior studies, we also used the
same events to test production and comprehension of
evidentials.
In Experiment 1, young learners of Turkish between
the ages of 3 and 6 successfully differentiated the two
past-tense morphemes on the basis of their evidential
function. That is, they were more likely to mark the
events they saw with the direct past tense (-dı) mor-
pheme as opposed to the indirect past tense (-mıs) mor-
pheme. Conversely, they marked the events they inferred
on the basis of available evidence with the indirect past
tense (-mıs) morpheme as opposed to the direct past
tense (-dı) morpheme. It should be noted that children
sometimes extended the direct past tense to non-
witnessed events (see also Ozturk & Papafragou, 2015
for similar results with older children). For instance, the
oldest group of 5- to 6-year-olds marked their descrip-
tions of Inferred events with the direct past tense (-dı)
morpheme for about 28% of the time. The percentages
for 3- and 4-year-olds were much lower (7% and 15%,
respectively) but these younger groups were also more
likely to mark their descriptions with other non-past
tense morphemes. These data suggest that the develop-
ment of evidential production is not completed yet. Nev-
ertheless, our findings lower prior estimates of evidential
production in past work (Aksu-Koç, 1988; Ozturk &
Papafragou, 2007, 2015; Ünal & Papafragou, 2013a), pre-
sumably because of the contextual cues that increased
the salience of the difference between inference and per-
ception (cf. also Aksu-Koç, 1988; Aksu-Koç et al., 2009, for
discussion of this point).3
Yet findings of Experiment 2 demonstrated that, when
children of similar ages had to match an evidentially
marked utterance to one of two versions of the same event
that differed only in terms of how the event was accessed
(perception vs. inference), performance was not as robust.
Even the oldest group of 5- to 6-year-old children per-
formed significantly worse in evidential comprehension
compared to adults who were at ceiling. These data con-
firm the previously documented production–comprehen
sion asymmetry in the domain of evidentiality and show
that this asymmetry emerges even for the same events.Origins of the production–comprehension asymmetry
In the remaining set of experiments, we evaluated two
alternative explanations of the asymmetry between evi-
dential production and comprehension. According to the
methodological hypothesis, the lag between evidential
production and comprehension could be attributed to the
higher memory, metalinguistic or other processing
loads of comprehension compared to production tasks.
According to the psycholinguistic hypothesis, evidential3 Recent data from Turkish-speaking adults show that the use of the
indirect past tense is sensitive to the ‘distance’ between the representation
formed by partial visual cues vs. the full visual perception of an event (Ünal,
Pinto, Bunger, & Papafragou, 2016). Future work should assess whether
similar factors affect the use of past-tense morphology in Turkish-learning
children.comprehension is delayed by the difficulty of embedding
evidential forms into reasoning about someone else’s
information sources.
Each of the two hypotheses makes a unique prediction
that is not shared by the other account. The methodolog-
ical hypothesis uniquely predicts that Turkish learners’
comprehension might improve in comprehension tasks
with lower memory and processing demands. Contrary
to this prediction, however, the difficulty with evidential
comprehension persisted across several alternative tasks.
Specifically, evidential comprehension was comparable
across Experiment 2 (where a single evidential utterance
had to be compared to two events), Experiment 3 (where
two evidentially marked utterances had to be compared
to one event) and Experiment 4 (where a single evidential
utterance had to be compared to one event).
Turning to the psycholinguistic hypothesis, this hypoth-
esis uniquely predicts that the asymmetry between evi-
dential production and comprehension might also
emerge in a non-evidential context, as long as the Self-
Other perspectives inherent in encoding vs. decoding evi-
dential meanings remained constant. This prediction was
confirmed: Experiment 5 revealed that children’s difficulty
persisted in a version of Experiment 4 in which children
had to reason about others’ knowledge sources (Others
task), but their performance improved when they had to
reason about evidence for the same events from their
own perspective (Self task).
Together, these results point to the conclusion that
Turkish learners’ difficulties with the comprehension of
evidential morphology is tied to the perspective-taking
demands of considering other cognizers’ access to informa-
tion. This conclusion coheres with prior developmental
studies showing that linguistic knowledge of evidentiality
builds on and closely follows conceptual knowledge about
sources of information, and suggests an even tighter and
more specific relation between linguistic knowledge of an
evidential system and children’s developing abilities to
handle various information sources compared to those
prior reports (Ozturk & Papafragou, 2015; Papafragou
et al., 2007). This conclusion is likely to generalize to other
languages beyond Turkish where the asymmetry has been
observed (e.g., Korean, Papafragou et al., 2007; English,
Winans et al., 2014). Naturally, the acquisition of the Turk-
ish evidential system involves multiple factors, including
mastering the complexities of mapping multiple informa-
tion sources in the world to the more abstract, two-way
direct–indirect distinction in the past tense (Ozturk &
Papafragou, 2015). Nevertheless, our results clearly show
that an important part of developing adult-like knowledge
of the evidential system involves navigating the difference
inherent in speaking about information access in one’s
own mind (in production) and other minds (in
comprehension).
Our results are also consistent with prior developmen-
tal studies showing that, when judging the knowledge
state of others, young children often fail to consider others’
informational access, despite the fact that they can gain
knowledge from different types of information sources
such as visual access or verbal report themselves (Pillow,
2002; Pillow & Anderson, 2006; Pillow et al., 2000;
E. Ünal, A. Papafragou / Journal of Memory and Language 89 (2016) 179–199 197Povinelli & de Blois, 1992; Sodian & Wimmer, 1987;
Wimmer et al., 1988). For instance, in one study, when
asked whether another child who had looked inside a
container knew what was inside the container, the vast
majority of the 3-year-olds and half of the 4-year-olds
either overattributed knowledge to the second child or
denied the second child knowledge altogether (Wimmer
et al., 1988). By contrast, all of the 5-year-olds selectively
attributed knowledge to the second child based on the sec-
ond child’s informational access. In another demonstra-
tion, 4-year-olds were able to draw a logical inference
about the color of a set of balls but failed to attribute the
same piece of knowledge to an adult, even though the
adult had access to the critical premise that would allow
her to draw the very same inference (Sodian & Wimmer,
1987). Six-year-olds in the same study correctly identified
the adult as knowledgeable about the balls’ color when she
had access to the critical premise. In subsequent experi-
ments, 4-year-olds kept neglecting the adult’s inferential
knowledge even when the adult shared the child’s perspec-
tive (Sodian & Wimmer, 1987), or when the children were
reminded of the critical premise that the adult knew
(Keenan, Ruffman, & Olson, 1994; Pillow, 1989). In those
studies, children had to explicitly reflect on and verbalize
the reasoning underlying others’ knowledge acquisition.
In our own studies (Experiment 5), we found that children
had difficulty reasoning about others’ knowledge sources
even when they did not have to explicitly talk about others’
knowledge states themselves.
One question left open by the current findings is how
children learn to produce the evidential morphemes of
Turkish in the first place. After all, some understanding of
the meaning of these forms in the speech of others is nec-
essary for children to acquire productive command of
them. We speculate that children begin with a coarse dis-
tinction between direct and indirect sources and implicitly
associate these information sources with the correspond-
ing evidentiality markers. However, this coarse distinction
might not be sufficient to fully master the conditions under
which these morphemes are used (and cannot support the
more nuanced and specific reasoning about others’ sources
required to pass the present and all previous comprehen-
sion tasks).
Viewed within the broader context of the relation
between speaking and understanding speech, our findings
are consistent with the idea that the mechanisms
involved in production and comprehension do not simply
involve the same steps executed in the reverse order
(Hurewitz et al., 2000). In production, speakers plan a
message to convey an intended meaning (in this case,
one’s own informational access) through a particular form
(evidentiality markers). In comprehension, the listener
must unpack the meaning carried by the forms in incom-
ing speech (and, in doing so, entertain concepts about
information access in other minds). Even though in
adults, these two processes are choreographed to align
closely, in children, they diverge until independent devel-
opments in children’s perspective-taking allow them to
co-ordinate.
Finally, the present results have implications for the
joint study of language production and comprehension inchildren, especially for cases where production seems to
emerge before successful and complete comprehension.
For instance, our approach suggests that task analysis,
stepwise manipulations of task demands and comparisons
to non-linguistic versions of the same experiments can
help ascertain both the boundaries of comprehension diffi-
culties and the theoretical nature of these difficulties.Acknowledgments
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Appendix A
List of events/objects used in Experiment 1.Trial type Event/objectSeen 1 Closing the cover of a box
Seen 2 Dropping three small objects into a jar
Seen 3 Stacking blocks
Seen 4 Pushing a carInferred 5 Coloring a star
Inferred 6 Cutting a piece of cardboard
Inferred 7 Inflating a balloon
Inferred 8 Tearing a shirtFiller 9 Giraffe






Filler 16 ButterflyNote: Events (1–3) and (5–7) were also used in Experiments 2–3. For
these later studies, we created both Seen and Inferred versions of each
event. Slightly modified incarnations of these new Seen and Inferred
versions were also used in Experiments 4 and 5 alongside additional
stimuli (see Appendix B).Appendix B
List of Events and Verbs Used in Experiments 4 and 5. In
Experiment 4, all verbs matched the events (but half of the
evidential morphemes on the verbs did). In Experiment 5,
only half of the verbs matched the events.
emory and Language 89 (2016) 179–199Verbs Verbs198 E. Ünal, A. Papafragou / Journal of M(Experiment
4)(Experiment
5)Matching trial events
1 Closing the cover
of a box
Closing Closing2 Dropping three
small objects into
a jarDropping Dropping3 Stacking blocks Stacking Stacking
4 Coloring a star Coloring Coloring
5 Cutting a piece of
cardboard
Cutting Cutting6 Inflating a balloon Inflating InflatingMismatching trial events
7 Biting a cookie Biting Washing
8 Dressing a toy frog Dressing Sleeping
9 Wearing a glove Wearing Jumping
10 Sticking band aid
on hand
Sticking Walking11 Pushing a car into
a boxPushing Combing12 Opening the cover
of a bookOpening TyingReferences
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